It holds in great generality that a plan is optimal for a dynamic programming problem, if and only if it is "thrifty" and "equalizing." An alternative characterization of an optimal plan that applies in many economic models is that the plan must satisfy an appropriate Euler equation and a transversality condition. Here we explore the connections between these two characterizations.
Introduction
It was shown by Dubins and Savage (1965) that necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be optimal for a gambling problem are that the strategy be "thrifty" and "equalizing." These conditions were later adapted for dynamic programming by Blackwell (1970) , Hordijk (1974) , Reider (1976) and Blume et al. (1982) , among others. For a special class of dynamic programming problems important in economic models, it has been shown that optimality is equivalent to the satisfaction of an "Euler equation" and a "transversality condition"; see Stokey and Lucas (1989) for a discussion and references. Our main objective here is to understand the relationship between these two characterizations of optimality. One corollary of our approach is a simple proof for the necessity of the transversality condition, which has been considered a difficult problem. (See Stokey and Lucas, page 102, and Kamihigashi (2005) .)
The notions of "thrifty" and "equalizing" seem not to be widely known to dynamic programmers working in economics, although they have proved to be quite useful in other contexts. We hope that this note will help spread the word about them.
Section 2 is a brief exposition of the thrifty-and-equalizing theory for a fairly general class of dynamic programming models. Section 3 introduces the Euler equation and the transversality condition, and then explains their relationship to the thrifty and equalizing conditions. In Section 4 we take a brief look at "envelope inequalities" and "Euler inequalities" for one-dimensional problems without imposing smoothness or interiority conditions, and obtain the necessity of an appropriate "transversality condition" in this context. There is an Appendix on measure theory in dynamic programming.
Thrifty and equalizing
Consider a dynamic programming problem (S, A, q, r, β) where S is a nonempty set of states, the mapping A assigns to each state s ∈ S a nonempty set A(s) of actions available at s, the law of motion q associates to each pair s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s) a probability distribution q(· |s, a) on S, the daily reward r(· , ·) is a nonnegative function defined on pairs (s, a) with s ∈ S and a ∈ A(s), and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. Play begins in some state s = s 1 , you choose an action a 1 ∈ A(s 1 ), receive a reward of r(s 1 , a 1 ), and the system moves to the next state s 2 which is an S−valued random variable with distribution q(· |s 1 , a 1 ). This process is iterated, yielding a random sequence
of states and actions, along with a total discounted reward
A plan is a sequence π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . .) , where π n tells you how to choose the n th action a n as a function π n (h n ) of the previous history h n = (s 1 , a 1 , · · · , s n−1 , a n−1 , s n ). A plan π, together with an initial state s 1 = s, determine the distribution P π,s of the random sequence in (2.1) as well as the expected total discounted reward, which we write as
The optimal reward or value at s is
Remark 1. Measure theory. If the state space S is uncountable, then nontrivial measure-theoretic questions arise in the theory. For example, it can happen that the value function V (·) is not Borel measurable, even when all the primitives of the problem are Borel in an appropriate sense (Blackwell, 1965) . To ease the exposition, we defer further discussion of these difficulties to the Appendix, where it will be explained how they can be resolved. For now we ask the reader to suspend disbelief and assume that the functions which arise in this section are measurable and the expectations are well-defined.
We shall assume, for simplicity, that
A key tool is the Bellman equation
which holds in great generality and is also known as the "optimality equation" (see, for example, section 9.4 of Bertsekas and Shreve, 1978) . For a ∈ A(s) and a measurable function
The Bellman equation can now be written in the form
Thus an action a ∈ A(s) conserves V (·) at s ∈ S, if and only if
Notice also that (T a V )(s) ≤ V (s) for all s and a ∈ A(s).
Let us fix now an initial state s = s 1 along with a plan π, and consider the random sequences {M n } n≥1 and {Q n } n≥1 , where
and
Let F n be the σ−field generated by the history h n = (s 1 , a 1 , . . . , s n−1 , a n−1 , s n ).
Lemma 1. For every plan π and initial state s, the adapted sequences {M n , F n } n≥1 and
Proof. Set Q 0 = 0. Then for any n ≥ 1 and any given history h n = (s 1 , a 1 , . . . , s n−1 , a n−1 , s n ), and letting a n = π n (h n ), we have
The sequence {Q n } n≥1 is nondecreasing, since the daily reward function r(·, ·) is nonnegative. From this fact and (2.3), it follows easily that {β n−1 V (s n ), F n } n≥1 is also a P π,s −supermartingale. All of these sequences are clearly nonnegative, because r(·, ·) is.
It follows from the lemma that the sequences {M n } n≥1 and {β n−1 V (s n )} n≥1 converge almost surely and are non-increasing in expectation, under
(2.5)
Here is an obvious, but useful, consequence of the string of inequalities in (2.5).
Theorem 2. The plan π is optimal at s ∈ S, if and only if π is both thrifty and equalizing at s.
The next two results give simple characterizations of thrifty and equalizing plans, respectively. 
Hence, equality must hold in (2.4) with probability one, and (b) follows. Now assume (b). Then equality holds P π,s −almost surely in (2.4), and thus (T a n V )(s n ) = V (s n ) almost surely, so (c) follows.
Finally, assume (c). Taking expectations in (2.4), we see that
The next result is obvious from (2.5).
Theorem 4. A given plan π is equalizing at s ∈ S, if and only if we have
Paraphrasing Blackwell (1970) , Theorem 3 says that a plan is thrifty if, with probability one, it makes no "immediate, irremediable mistakes" along any history; whereas Theorem 4 says that a plan is equalizing, if "it is certain to force the system into states where little further income can be anticipated."
We conclude this section with a brief look at the problem on a finite horizon. For n = 1, 2, . . . and s ∈ S, define the optimal n-day return as
The following result records the well-known backward induction algorithm and the fact that the optimal n-day return converges to that for the infinite-horizon problem. For a proof, see section 9.5 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) .
The Euler and transversality conditions
We now specialize to problems with concave daily reward functions and convex action sets as in Stokey and Lucas (1989) . We shall use the notation and many of the assumptions of Stokey and Lucas and, for the sake of brevity, will refer to their book as just S&L.
As in S&L, we assume that the state space S is a product S = X × Z , with a state s = (x, z) consisting of an "endogenous state" x ∈ X and an "exogenous shock" z ∈ Z. The sets X and Z are assumed to be nonempty convex Borel subsets of the Euclidean spaces R l and R k , respectively. For each s = (x, z) , the action set A(s) = Γ(x, z) is a nonempty Borel subset of X and is convex in x : that is, if y ∈ Γ(x, z), y ∈ Γ(x , z), and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, then we have θy + (1 − θ)y ∈ Γ(θx + (1 − θ)x , z) , as in Assumption 9.11 of S&L. The daily reward function is now of the form r(s, y) = F (x, y, z) .
is a given, Borel measurable "reward" function, concave in the pair (x, y) for every given z ∈ Z (Assumption 9.10 of S&L).
The law of motion is of the form
where a = y ∈ Γ(x, z) and the distribution of the Z−valued random variable z is given by a Markov kernel q(dξ|z) . Note that the action y is the next value of the endogenous state: y n ≡ x n+1 for n ≥ 1. The Bellman equation becomes
(There is a technical oversight in S&L, pages 246 and 273, where it is stated that, under these conditions, there may not be a Bellman equation because of measurability issues; see Remark 1 above, as well as the Appendix.) Let
be the function occuring inside the supremum in (3.1).
Lemma 6. The value function V (y, z) is concave in y, and, hence, so is
Proof. Let V 0 (·, ·) be identically zero and, for n ≥ 1, let V n (·, ·) be the optimal n-day return function as in (2.6) with s = (x, z). Then, by Theorem 5(a),
is the supremum of a concave function over a convex set and, by a well-known result, is also concave. By induction, we conclude that all of the functions V n (· , z) are concave. By Theorem 5(b), the function V (· , z) is the pointwise limit of concave functions and is therefore concave as well. The assertions about the function ψ of (3.2) are now easy to check.
The usual treatment of the Euler and transversality conditions assumes that the plans in question are at interior states and choose interior actions. To be precise, we say that the state s = (x, z) is interior, if x is in the interior of the set X; and we say that the action y at s is interior, if y belongs to the interior of the set Γ(x, z). A plan π is called interior at s = (x, z) if s is interior and, with probability one under P π,s , only interior states are visited and only interior actions are taken.
We assume for the remainder of this section that the daily reward function F (x, y, z) is continuous on X × X × Z, and continuously differentiable in x and y for (x, y) in the interior of X × X. We shall use the notation D i F (x, y, z) for the partial derivative of F at (x, y, z) with respect to the i th coördinate, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2l. Let D x F be the vector (D 1 F, D 2 F, . . . , D l F ) consisting of the partial derivatives of F with respect to its first l arguments, and let D y F be the vector (D l+1 F, D l+2 F, . . . , D 2l F ) of the next l partial derivatives of F . We shall use similar notation for the partial derivatives of other functions, such as V (x, z).
We shall assume (cf. Assumptions 9.8 and 9.9 in S&L) that the action sets Γ(x, z) and the daily reward function F (x, y, z) are nondecreasing in x; that is,
Proof. To verify (i), let x ≤ x and consider any plan π for a player who begins at state (x, z). By (3.3) a second player at (x , z) can choose the same initial action y and receive an initial daily reward at least as large as that for the first player. Both players proceed to the state (y, z), where z has distribution q(·|z). Thus the second player can earn the same rewards as the first thereafter.
For part (ii), consider the quotients
By part (i), these quotients are nonnegative; and by the concavity of V (· , z), they are nondecreasing as ε ↓ 0 (see Roberts and Varberg (1973) , pages 4 and 5). The desired equality now follows from the monotone convergence theorem.
Theorem 8. Suppose that π is an interior plan at s = (x, z). Then π is thrifty at s, if and only if the following hold with probability one under P π,s , for all n = 1, 2, . . . : (a) the Envelope equation:
Proof. By Theorem 3 the actions y n conserve V (·, ·) at s n with probability one. Hence y n maximizes ψ(x n , · , z n ) over Γ(x n , z n ) on an event of probability one. The envelope equation can now be proved for outcomes in this event exactly as in the proof of Theorem 9.10, page 267, of S&L; namely, using the concavity of ψ(x n , · , z n ) from Lemma 6, and the fact that 
(Note that (y, ξ) → D x V (y, ξ) is continuous by (a).)
To prove the converse, assume that (a) and (b) hold. We need to show that, with P π,s −probability one, y n maximizes the concave function
on the set Γ(x n , z n ), for each n ∈ N. But by (a), (b) and Lemma 7(ii), we obtain
with P π,s −probability one.
To prove the necessity of the customary transversality condition for an optimal interior plan, we shall make use of both its thriftiness and equalization properties.
Theorem 9. Suppose the plan π is optimal and interior at s = (x, z), and that the reward function satisfies
for all interior states (x, z) and interior actions y ∈ Γ(x, z) . Then π satisfies (c) the Transversality Condition: in (3.4) and (3.5) signifies the usual inner product in R l .)
Proof. Since π is optimal, it is thrifty by Theorem 2 and thus, with P π,s −probability one, it satisfies the envelope equation; therefore, for all n = 1, 2, · · · , we have
Here, the first inequality holds because V (· , ·) is nonnegative; the second inequality follows from a general property of concave functions (Theorem A, Chapter IV, page 98 in Roberts and Varberg (1973) ); the equality is by the envelope equation (a) in Theorem 7; and the last inequality is from condition (3.4). Since π is optimal, it is also equalizing by Theorem 2. Now take expectations under P π,s in (3.6), and use Theorem 4.
Notice that D x F (x, y, z) ≥ 0 since, by (3.3), F (x, y, z) is nondecreasing in x. Thus assumption (3.4) in the statement of Theorem 9 is automatically true if all the states x ∈ X lie in the nonnegative orthant of R l , as is often true in economic applications.
The next result is familiar to dynamic programmers working in economics.
Theorem 10. Suppose the plan π is interior at s = (x, z), and that the assumption (3.4) holds. Then π is optimal, if and only if it satisfies both the Euler equation with P π,s −probability one, and the transversality condition.
Proof. If π is optimal, then it is thrifty by Theorem 2; if in addition it is interior at s = (x, z), it satisfies also the Euler equations with P π,s −probability one, by Theorem 8. The transversality condition holds by Theorem 9.
As stated in S&L, page 281, it is straightforward to adapt their proof for the non-stochastic case (Theorem 4.15, page 98) that the two conditions of Euler and transversality imply optimality.
By Theorems 2 and 9, the thrifty and equalizing conditions are equivalent to the Euler equations and the transversality condition for the special problems of this section when the plan π is interior.
Envelope and Euler inequalities
In the one-dimensional case l = 1 it is possible to replace the Envelope Equation and the Euler Equation of Theorem 8 with appropriate inequalities, thereby dispensing with interiority assumptions on the part of the plan π.
Let us illustrate this possibility by taking
is continuous, concave, and non-decreasing in the first argument. In particular, we have Γ(x, z) ⊆ Γ(x + ε, z) for ε > 0 and every (x, z) ∈ [0, ∞) × Z . We also assume that F (·, y, z) is concave, nondecreasing, and nonnegative for all (x, z), but we shall no longer assume that this function is differentiable. We shall denote by
the left-and rightderivatives at x = x 0 of the concave functions F (· , y, z) and V (· , z) , respectively.
Theorem 11. Envelope Inequalities: If the plan π is thrifty at s = (x 1 , z 1 ) then, with probability one under P π,s , we have for all n = 1, 2, . . . the properties
Proof. By Theorem 3 the actions y n conserve V (· , ·) at (x n , z n ) on an event of P π,s −probability one. Consider the function
The inequality (4.1) follows.
As for the second inequality, it follows from the continuity of the function γ(· , z n ) that y n ∈ Γ(x n − ε, z n ) for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Hence, for such ε,
Theorem 12. Euler Inequalities: If the plan π is thrifty at s = (x 1 , z 1 ) then, with probability one under P π,s , we have for all n = 1, 2, . . . the inequalities
Proof. By Theorem 3, we have with probability one that the action y n conserves V (·, ·) at each state s n = (x n , z n ), n = 1, 2, . . . . To wit, the concave function y → ψ(x n , y, z n ) of (3.2) is maximized over Γ(x n , z n ) at y n . This implies
are nonnegative, and increase as ε ↓ 0 . This is because the function F (·, y, z) is increasing and concave, which implies that V (·, z) is also increasing and concave. Thus, by monotone convergence, we obtain
Similar reasoning gives the same formula for left-derivatives at (y, z) ∈ (0, ∞). An application of the Envelope Inequality (4.1) to (4.5) now yields
on the event {y n < γ(x n , z n )}. This proves (4.3); the inequality (4.4) is proved similarly.
It is now possible, in the special setting of this section, to show that a transversality condition is necessary for a plan to be optimal, even without interiority or smoothness of the daily reward.
Proof. We calculate as follows:
The equality above follows from a general fact about concave functions (see problem A, page 13 in Roberts and Varberg (1973) ); the second inequality holds because D + x V (x, z n ) is nonincreasing in x; the third inequality is by the Envelope inequality (4.1), which applies because the optimality of π implies it is thrifty by Theorem 2; the final inequality holds because x n ≥ 0 and F (·, y n , z n ) is nondecreasing. Since π is optimal, it is equalizing by Theorem 2. Now apply Theorem 4.
We leave open the question of whether there is a converse in the context of this section. That is, if a plan π satisfies the Transversality Condition (4.7) and the Euler Inequalities (4.3) and (4.4) hold with probability one, is π then necessarily optimal?
Appendix on Measurability
Our object here is to describe a fairly general class of dynamic programming problems for which the optimal reward function is measurable in an appropriate sense. We shall only sketch the proof and provide references for further details.
A dynamic programming problem (S, A, q, r, β) as in section 2 will be called measurable if the following hold:
(a) The state space S is a nonempty Borel subset of a Polish space. (A topological space is Polish if it is homeomorphic to a complete, separable metric space. In particular, any Euclidean space is Polish.) (b) There is a Polish space X that contains the union of the action sets A(s), s ∈ S. Furthermore, the set
is a Borel subset of the product space S × X. We also need to impose measurability conditions on the plans that a player is allowed to choose. To do so, we introduce the notion of universal measurability.
Let Y be a Polish space and let B be its σ-field of Borel subsets. Notice that f dµ is well-defined for every universally measurable function f : Y → [0, ∞) and every probability measure µ defined on B.
A plan π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . .) is universally measurable if, for every n = 1, 2, . . ., π n is a universally measurable function from (S × X) n−1 × S to X. Let Π be the set of all universally measurable plans π. Let H = S × X × S × X × · · · be the Polish space of all infinite histories h = (s 1 , a 1 , s 2 , a 2 , . . .). Each state s ∈ S together with a plan π ∈ Π determines a probability measure P Proof. We will only sketch the main ideas. For more details, see Theorem 4.2 of Feinberg (1996) . (Feinberg uses Borel rather than universally measurable plans and, for this reason, must assume that the set A contains the graph of a Borelmeasurable function from S into X.) Let M(H) be the set of all probability measures on the Borel subsets of H. Then M(H), when equipped with its usual topology of vague convergence, is again a Polish space (cf. Parthasarathy, 1967) . It can be shown that the set It is not difficult to check that the function M(H) µ → g dµ ∈ R is Borel-measurable.
Also, for each real number c , the set S c = {s ∈ S : V (s) > c } is the projection onto S of the Borel set B c = {(s, µ) ∈ L : g dµ > c } . Thus S c is an analytic set, and therefore universally measurable (Corollary 7.42.1, page 169 in Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) ; Theorem 10.40, page 393 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) ). It follows that V (·) is universally measurable.
